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The Pay-Off on Nursing Home Report Cards
Abstract
For the past decade, policymakers have used public reporting of quality measures as a strategy to improve
quality in nursing homes. In theory, public reporting might improve overall quality in two ways: first, if
consumers choose nursing homes with better performance, and second, if public reporting encourages
nursing homes to improve their performance. Has public reporting had its intended effects? Does improving
quality give nursing homes a competitive advantage in the marketplace, thereby improving their bottom line?
This Issue Brief summarizes a series of studies that assess the impact of public reporting on nursing home
quality and on the financial performance of these facilities.
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The Pay-Off on Nursing Home 
Report Cards
Editor’s note: For the past decade, policymakers have used public reporting of 
quality measures as a strategy to improve quality in nursing homes. In theory, 
public reporting might improve overall quality in two ways: first, if consumers 
choose nursing homes with better performance, and second, if public reporting 
encourages nursing homes to improve their performance. Has public reporting 
had its intended effects? Does improving quality give nursing homes a competitive 
advantage in the marketplace, thereby improving their bottom line? This Issue 
Brief summarizes a series of studies that assess the impact of public reporting on 
nursing home quality and on the financial performance of these facilities.  
In 2002, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) began publicly reporting 
the quality of care at more than 17,000 Medicare- or Medicaid-certified nursing 
homes in the US through the website, Nursing Home Compare (NHC).  The 
website provides general information about nursing home characteristics, nurse 
staffing information, clinical quality measures, and inspection results. 
•	 When	NHC	was	launched,	it	included	three	measures	of	postacute	(short-stay)	
care and seven measures of chronic (long-term) care. About 11% of nursing 
home beds are filled at any one time by Medicare beneficiaries receiving 
postacute care as a transition between hospitalization and home or other long-
term setting. The NHC measures contain information on residents’ health, 
physical functioning, mental status, and psychosocial well-being.
•	 Public	reporting	of	nursing	home	quality	provides	greater	transparency	and	
understanding of the care these facilities provide. Nevertheless, two important 
questions remain: First, does this reporting improve the quality of care delivered 
to nursing home residents? Second, what costs do these measures (or responses 
to them) create for nursing homes, and are those costs offset by any financial 
gains? Even if performance improves, nursing homes may want solid evidence 
that quality pays before making the continued investment that may be necessary 
to sustain it.
Nursing Home Compare 
website provides public 
information on nursing home 
quality measures 
Study links small 
improvements in postacute 
nursing home care to NHC
To analyze the effect of public reporting on the quality of nursing home care, 
Werner	and	colleagues	compared	clinical	measures	before	and	after	the	launch	of	
NHC. They focused on postacute care because high turnover rates and younger, 
less cognitively impaired residents make finding an effect from public reporting 
more likely in a short time frame. 
•	 The	study	used	data	from	Medicare’s	Minimum	Data	Set	(MDS)	for	the	years	
1999-2005, spanning 2002, when NHC was launched The MDS is the source 
of quality information reported on NHC. They used data from small nursing 
homes (that were not included in NHC) as a control group.
•	 They	used	the	three	measures	of	postacute	care	quality	on	NHC	since	2002:	
percent of patients without moderate or severe pain; percent of patients without 
delirium; and percent of patients whose walking improved. To separate out the 
effects on reported versus unreported performance, they also looked at a general 
measure of quality that is not reported on NHC—the rate of preventable 
hospitalizations within 30 days of admission.
•	 A	total	of	8,137	nursing	homes	were	included	in	the	study.		The	control	group	
consisted of 2,277 small nursing homes. The investigators used statistical 
measures to account for changes in patient profiles within each nursing home 
and market shares across nursing homes.
•	 The	three	reported	quality	measures	were	better	in	the	three	years	after 
NHC was launched compared with before. Rates of preventable 
hospitalizations, which were not reported, did not change. Over those years, 
the percent of patient without moderate to severe pain improved by 2 
percentage points (on a base of 76%), the percentage of patients without 
delirium improved by 0.5 percentage points (on a base of 96%) and the 
percentage of patients with improved walking improved by 0.2 percentage 
points (on a base of 7%). The largest change in quality occurred between 2002 
and 2003, when NHC was launched.
•	 The	magnitude	of	the	improvements	was	small.	For	example,	improvement	in	
pain control attributable to NHC was less than 1%. But with more than 1.5 
million patients admitted to postacute care annually, this quality improvement 
translates into about 12,000 fewer patients in moderate to severe pain. 
Analyses reveal why 
performance reporting 
improved quality
The investigators sought to determine the pathways by which public reporting 
could affect quality measures. 
•	 The	investigators	found	that	patient-level	quality	improved	both	because	
consumers chose higher-quality nursing homes and because providers improved 
the care they delivered. 
•	 Further	analyses	of	resident	characteristics	at	admission	revealed	evidence	of	
“sorting”—changes in illness severity. After the launch of NHC, high-risk 
patients—or patients with pain on admission—were more likely to go to 
facilities that scored well on the pain quality measure and low-risk patients were 
more likely to go to low-scoring facilities for postacute care.
•	 The	investigators	also	found	that	the	incidence	of	admission	pain	decreased	
after the NHC launch in a way not fully predicted by other patient 
characteristics, suggesting that the facilities were “downcoding” 
high-risk patients. 
Nursing homes that improve 
on quality may reap economic 
rewards
The	study	included	6,286	facilities	having	consistent	financial	data	and	quality	
information.	These	facilities	were	categorized	by	quality	score	(812	as	high-scoring,	
802	as	low-scoring,	and	4,672	as	middle-scoring)	and	by	improvement 
(1,507	as	improved,	4,337	as	no	change).
•	 Generally,	high-scoring nursing homes and those that improved had better 
financial performance in the post-NHC period compared to facilities that did 
not perform as well, as measured by larger increases in revenues.
•	 Neither	high-performing	nor	improving	facilities	exhibited	cost	savings, 
consistent	with	the	expectation	that	quality	improvement	requires	some	
investment of resources.
•	 The net effect on finances, as measured by operating and total profit margins, 
is that facilities that improve on quality measures also improve in profitability 
compared to facilities that do not improve. High-scoring facilities show similar 
patterns, although the changes are not statistically significant. Importantly, 
improving facilities had better financial performance even at middle levels of 
quality scores.
•	 Further	analyses	revealed	that	high-performing	and	improving	facilities	had 
larger increases in occupancy and Medicare days (as opposed to Medicaid days) 
than the nonimproving group. It appears that the effects of NHC on financial 
status are not realized through increases in occupancy per se, but rather through 
changes	in	payer	mix.
Making the business case 
for quality
Werner	and	colleagues	examined	whether	high	performance	or	improvement	
on quality measures led to economic rewards for nursing homes in the presence 
of public reporting. They used the MDS and Medicare Cost Reports to obtain 
financial information, the MDS for clinical quality measures, and data from state 
inspections to assess facility-level changes from the pre-public reporting period 
(1999-2002) and the post-public reporting period (2003-2005). 
•	 For this analysis, the investigators used 15 facility-level quality measures. 
They linked these measures with Medicare Cost Reports and inspection data 
from the same year for each facility.
•	 They	examined	four	standard	measures	of	financial	performance:	net	resident	
revenues,	total	operating	expenses,	operating	profit	margin,	and	total 
profit margin.
•	 They controlled for other factors that might affect financial performance, 
such as ownership, whether the facility was part of a chain, bed size, and 
market concentration.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS The results support the use of public reporting to improve the quality of 
care in nursing homes. The “business case” suggests that public reporting offers 
a viable incentive to induce sustainable change. At least part of the improved 
financial performance is due to an increased ability to attract high-margin 
Medicare patients.
•	 These	results	indicate	that	public	reporting	seems	to	be	working	as	intended,	
albeit to only a modest degree. To achieve more robust quality improvement, 
stronger incentives may be needed. One strategy is to combine public reporting 
with pay for performance. 
•	 Some	questions	about	public	reporting	remain,	including	whether	quality	
improvements	extend	to	all	patients,	are	large	enough	to	be	meaningful	to	
patients, and result in improved overall care. 
•	 These	results	raise	an	important	policy	concern	that	over	time	public	reporting	
may reduce a low-scoring facility’s ability to further respond to quality 
improvement incentives. If it worsens finances for low-performing providers, 
and those providers disproportionately serve low-income and Medicaid patients, 
it may widen the disparities in quality between these patient groups.
